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APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage 
brought by the driver of an automobile, Sylvia Keller, and a 
passenger, Lottie Draper, when the automobile they were in was 
struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by the defendant, Dwight 
Shelley, on December 31, 1973. It is claimed that the defendant, 
Dwight Shelley, was negligent in the manner in which he operated 
his vehicle. The defendant denies that he was negligent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court submitted the issue of negligence and dam-
ages to the jury. The jury found that the defendant was not 
negligent, but nonetheless, awarded damages to the plaintiff and 
third-party defendant. The trial court, in interpreting the ver-
dict, entered judgment in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
The trial court denied the plaintiff and third-party defen-
dant's motion for a directed verdict and motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial court 
reversed and have the case remanded to the trial court with an 
order to enter a directed verdict in favor of the appellants, or, 
in the alternative, to set aside the judgment and grant a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are fairly simple. On the afternoon 
of December 31, 1973, the appellants traveled from their home in 
Sanpete County to the Provo area for the purpose of going to din-
ner with friends and family. (Transcript "T." 44) Early in the 
evening, the appellants drove south from Provo to Springville on 
State Road No. 8, a four-lane highway with two lanes of traffic 
in each direction. (Exhibit 19) They intended to spend the even-
ing at the Sage Inn Motel located at the north end of Springville. 
They were traveling in the inside lane of traffic and as they 
neared the Sage Inn, they reduced their speed, activated the left 
turn signal and came to a stop, waiting for oncoming traffic to 
clear so they could turn left into the parking lot of the Inn. 
(T. 44) While waiting for the oncoming traffic to clear, appel-
lants were struck from the rear by respondent's automobile. 
The respondent worked in Provo and lived in Springville. At 
the scene of the accident, he told appellants that he had been in 
a hurry to get home from work that night. (T. 131) He was travel-
ing south on State Road No. 8 in the outside lane of traffic at 
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approximately 40 m.p.h. (T. 166) He was closely following 
another vehicle waiting to clear the intersection he was approach-
ing so that he could change to the faster inside lane* (T. 174) 
Once through the intersection, respondent changed to the inside 
lane and accelerated to between 50 and 55 m.p.h. (T. 170, 174) 
He then saw appellants waiting to make their left turn, slammed 
on his brakes and struck the appellants from the rear. (T. 167) 
The force of the impact was so great that it ripped the front 
seat of appellants1 car out of the floor, shearing off the bolts 
which fastened the seat to the floor. (T. 40, Exhibit 7) Appel-
lants1 car came to rest 286f5" from the point of impact. (T. 39, 
Exhibit 19) 
At the scene of the accident and for some distance in either 
direction, the highway is straight and level. (Exhibit 19) The 
road was dry and the weather was clear. (T. 14) Respondent does 
not recall ever looking ahead in the lane to which he changed. 
(T. 173) There is uncontroverted testimony that appellants had 
their lights on and left turn signal flashing. (T. 45) The 
accident occurred at 6:20 p.m., and while it was dusk, it was 
not completely dark. (T. 165) There were street lights all 
around illuminating the point of impact and surrounding areas. 
(T. 174) There is a street light next to the point of impact. 
(T. 16) In addition, there were lights from a construction yard 
next to the accident scene which provided further light. (T. 16, 
17) Respondent testified that the distance from the point of 
impact in front of the Sage Inn to the intersection that he was 
waiting to get through so he could change lanes was 1/3 mile. (T. 
173) An investigating officer measured it by his patrol car as 
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1/3 mile. (T. 16) There is a conflict in the testimony as to 
the exact distance from the point of impact to the place where 
respondent changed lanes. The highway patrolman investigating 
the accident, Officer Nusink, testified that when making out the 
accident report, the respondent told him he made the lane change 
approximately at the V.F.W. Club, a point just before the inter-
section in question, a distance of 1/3 mile. (T. 78) In his 
deposition, respondent testified that he made his lane change 
just after the intersection. (T. 174) During the trial, respon-
dent testified at one point that he made the lane change about 
two blocks from where he struck appellants from the rear. (T. 
172) At another point in the testimony, he said he thought he 
had about three times the length of the skid marks from the point 
he changed lanes to the point of impact. (T. 172) His skid 
marks were 96!8!l, so he had, at the very least, 290' to see 
the appellants and stop or avoid them. (Exhibit 19) 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO 
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS1 MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the close of respondent's case in the lower court, appel-
lants made a motion for a directed verdict that the respondent 
was negligent as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper look-
out. The motion was denied by the Court and the issue was sub-
mitted to the jury. (T. 179, 180) 
It has long been established in Utah that a motorist must 
keep a proper lookout for vehicles and objects in the roadway 
ahead of him, and he must operate his vehicle in such a manner as 
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to avoid striking such objects as could be seen by an ordinarily 
observant person. Indeed, this Court has regularly held that if 
it is clear that a motorist failed to see what he should have 
seen, and such failure caused him to strike or hit another vehicle 
or object, such failure may be negligence as a matter of law. 
In Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products, 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 
309 (1932), a motorist approaching from the rear was held to be 
negligent as a matter of law for failing to see a truck in time 
to avoid hitting it* In spite of the fact that the collision 
occurred at night, the truck was parked illegally in the roadway, 
and the truck had.no tail lights, the court found that the ap-
proaching motorist should have seen the truck in time to avoid 
a collision and was negligent as a matter of law for failing to 
do so. The Court emphasized that the highway was straight and 
level, the truck was directly in front of him, and there was 
nothing to obstruct his view. In affirming an order granting 
summary judgment, this court said: 
In such a case it must inevitably follow 
that [the motorist] did not keep a lookout 
ahead, or, if he did, he either did not heed 
what he saw or he could not see the truck be-
cause his lights were not such as were pres-
cribed by law. . . It follows that his fail-
ure to discover the truck sooner was a prox-
imate cause of the accident and resulting 
injury. Dalley, supra, 311-12. 
The Dalley case has been critized as being too broad. Cri-
tics feared that the language of the case, if given full effect, 
would require a court to find negligence as a matter of lav; every 
time a motorist struck an object he failed to see even if such 
failure were not his fault. (See, for example, the dissent of 
Justice Wolfe in Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P.2d 1366 at 
-5- ; 
1371.) Such fears have not been realized, however* In Nielsen 
v. Watanobe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P.2d 117, this Court held that a 
motorist did not breach his duty to keep a proper lookout when he 
was blinded by oncoming headlights* But this Court has uniformly 
upheld the Dalley doctrine when the facts show that the driver 
failed to keep a proper lookout to avoid a collision. 
In Hirschbach v. Dubuque Packing Co,, 7 Utah 2d 7, 216 P.2d 
319 (1957)/ this Court again held that it was negligence as a 
matter of law for a motorist approaching from the rear to fail to 
see a truck stopped in the roadway in time to avoid hitting it. 
The Court emphasized that even though the truck was stopped in 
the middle of the road at night, the motorist approaching from 
the rear failed to see what he should have seen, or if he did 
see the truck, then he failed to act to avoid a collision. 
The lower court granted the summary judg-
ment on the ground that under the rule announc-
ed in Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 
80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309, appellant's driver 
was guilty of negligence which proximately con-
tributed to the accident as a matter of law be-
cause he was driving in such a manner that he 
failed to stop or act to avoid the collision 
within the distance the law requires his lights 
to show substantial objects in front of him. 
We agree. Hirschbach, supra, at 319. 
The facts of the case now before the Court are very similar 
to the facts in Dalley and Hirschbach. In the instant case, 
appellants were stopped in the left lane of traffic with their 
lights on and left turn signal flashing, waiting for the oncom-
ing traffic to clear so they could make a left turn, when they 
were struck from behind by the respondent. 
It is clear from respondent's testimony that he failed to 
keep a proper lookout. He testified that he did not remember 
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looking ahead before he changed lanes and after he changes lanes, 
he had, at the very least, 300 feet in which to see appellants 
and avoid striking them. Respondent's breach of duty to see 
what he should have seen is so clear from the record that the 
Court below should have declared respondent negligent as a mat-
ter of law and granted appellants1 motion for a directed verdict. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING RESPONDENT"S INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER SEVEN ON SUDDEN PERIL./ 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
When one is suddenly confronted by an 
emergency not of his own making, consisting 
of circumstances that call for immediate, 
instinctive action, he is not required to 
exercise the same degree of care that he 
would be required to exercise had he time 
for reflection. Under such circumstances 
he is required to exercise such care as an 
ordinary person would exercise when con-
fronted by a like emergency under circum-
stances then existing. The rule of sudden 
emergency cannot be invoked by a person 
who brought the emergency upon himself by 
his fault or did not use ordinary care to 
avoid it. (R. 84) 
In Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971) , • 
this Court held that it was reversible error to give a sudden 
peril instruction when the facts were such that defendant had 
failed to observe what he should have observed. In that case, 
the defendant failed to see a small child who was in plain view. 
The roadway and shoulders were level* There was no contention 
that the child suddenly darted out. The defendant simply fail-
ed to see what he should have seen. Holding that in such a situa-
tion an instruction on sudden peril was reversible error, this 
Court said: 
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Had there been evidence of a sudden or 
unexpected situation arising without fault 
on the part of the defendant, the instruc-
tion would be proper. However, in this case, 
the sudden and unexpected situation arose 
when the defendant saw what he should, have 
seen all the time. One who is confronted 
with an emergency occasioned by his own ne-
glect is not entitled to have such an in-
struction given to the jury. It tends to 
lead the jury to belief that the Court 
thought there was a sudden emergency pre-
sented to a careful driver free from any 
negligence. Solt, supra, at 477. 
Last year, this Court stated in Wiscombe v. Cole, 30 Utah 
2d 441, 519 P.2d 881, quoting from Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 
2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115, at 1117, 1118: "The jury could have be-
lieved that the plaintiff created his own peril and thus was not 
entitled to the benefits of 'sudden emergency1." In the case at 
bar, there was a great deal of evidence from which the jury could 
have found the respondent created his own peril and thus he was 
not entitled to the benefit of a "sudden emergency" instruction* 
The record shows that the respondent changed from the outside 
lane to the inside lane without first assuring himself that it 
was safe to do so. After he made his lane change, he continued 
to increase his speed until he finally observed appellants in the 
lane ahead of him waiting to make a left turn. When he finally 
observed them, he slammed on his brakes, but it was too late to 
avoid violently striking appellants from the rear. 
This was not a case of a suddenly-changing situatiion; appel-
lants were simply waiting for the oncoming traffic to clear so 
they could make their turn. Respondent simply failed to observe 
what was in front of him before it was too late. The instruction 
given "tend[ed] to lead the jury to believe that the Court thought 
there was a sudden emergency presented to a careful driver free 
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from any negligence", and was, therefore, reversible error* SoIt, 
supra, at 477. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE ONE OF APPELLANTSr 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, AND IN SO DOING, PREVENTED APPELLANTS1 
THEORY OF THE CASE FROM GOING TO THE JURY. 
The last two paragraphs of jury instruction number six as 
given by the trial court are as follows: 
Under the laws of this state on a mul-
tiple lane highway two single solid yellow 
longitudinal lines four inches in width and 
spaced in excess of two feet apart shall 
constitute a distinctive roadway marking to 
which no traffic shall travel to the left 
thereof; however the use of such a distinc-
tive roadway marking shall not be construed 
to prohibit traffic movements across, and 
where practical left turn movements must 
commence from within such a distinctive 
roadway marking. 
Failure of a driver to operate his ve-
hicle in accordance with the foregoing 
requirements of law would constitute neg-
ligence on his part. (R. 83) 
As instructed, the jury was told that if the appellants failed 
to commence their turn witnin the two yellow lines as described 
in the instruction, they were negligent in failing to do so* 
Appellants requested, but were denied, the following jury 
instruction: 
You are instructed that it is not neg-
ligence to disobey a traffic control device • 
if at the time the control device (highway 
markings) was not sufficiently legible to be 
seen by an ordinarily observant person. (R. 
74) 
The foregoing instruction is based on §41-6-23(b), U.C.A., 1953, 
which provides in pertinent part that: 
. . .no provision of this act for which of-
ficial traffic-control devices are required, 
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shall be enforced against an alleged viola-
tor if at the time and place of the alleged 
violation an official device is not in prop-
er position and sufficiently legible to be 
seen by an ordinarily observant person. 
As can be seen by §41-6-23(b), it is not always true that 
failure to act in accordance with road markings would be negli-
gence as a matter of law. If the markings were so difficult to 
see that they were not legible to the ordinarily observant per-
son, then failure to obey them would not constitute negligence. 
There was considerable evidence that at the time of the 
accident, the center of the roadway was covered with dirt and 
cinders making the center lines illegible. The driver of appel-
lants1 car testified that because of the extremely dirty condi-
tion of the road, she saw only the line closest to her lane of 
traffic and not the other line ten feet to the left. (T. 45, 
106) The passenger in appellants1 car also testified that the 
center of the road was covered with dirt and cinders making the 
center lines difficult to see. (T. 148, 149) Exhibit 2 is a 
photograph of the road where the accident occurred, taken sometime 
after the accident. It shows a considerable amount of dirt and 
cinders on the center portion of the highway. Appellants testi-
fied that on the night of the accident there were considerably 
more cinders and dirt than shown in the photograph. (T. 107) 
Considering the above testimony, and the fact that the accident 
took place at night, the jury had a great deal of evidence from 
which they could have concluded that the center lines were not 
sufficiently legible for an ordinarily observant person to see, 
and might have so concluded, had they been properly instructed. 
The trial court's refusal to give the appellants1 requested in-
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struction prejudiced the appellants1 case and denied them their 
right to give the jury their theory of the case. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE EFFECT 
THEIR ANSWERS WOULD HAVE ON THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE CASE. 
This.case was submitted to the jury in the form of a special 
verdict/ After the jury retired to deliberate, they had consid-
erable difficulty with instruction 23, the special verdict instruc-
tion. (T. 190-192, R 90-91) After some, discussion between the 
attorneys and the Court, the jury was instructed as follows: 
THE COURT: I believe I may know what your 
trouble is. First I will read question number 
six. 
(Reading) "Without regard to any of 
the previous questions and your answers 
thereto, and in any event, state the 
amount of damages sustained by the plain-
tiffs Sylvia Keller and Lottie Draper as 
a result of the occurrence." 
Now ladies and gentlemen, in this case that 
is now before the Court there is a body of law 
governing it adopted by the legislature of this 
State called collectively "comparative negli-
gence". In a case of this sort the jury does 
not award anyone anything. The jury answers 
certain questions of fact and then the Court 
as a matter of law applies certain formula, 
depending on the answers, and determines if 
and in what amount anyone is awarded anything. 
So that your verdict as such does not consti-
tute an award. It constitutes a factual de-
termination. It answers certain questions of 
fact which are in dispute. With that in mind 
I will re-read question number six: 
(Reading) "Without regard to any of 
the previous questions and your answers 
thereto, and in any event, state the 
amount of damages sustained by the plain-
tiffs Sylvia Keller and Lottie Draper as 
a result of the occurrence." 
And you arrive at your answers to those 
questions in the light of my general instruc-
tions on what should guide you in considering 
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the evidence and weighing it and instructions 
numbers nine and nine A. But the jury in a 
case of this sort makes no award. It does not 
deny anyone an award. The Court does that un-
der certain legal rules. 
Now do you have any questions? Does 
that clarify the matter? 
JURY FOREMAN: That clarified it, sir. 
(T. 192) 
This instruction from the Judge in effect informs the jury 
what affect their answers will have on the final outcome of the 
case. 
This court has ruled in the case of R. William McGuinn II 
and Floy W. McGuinn v. Utah Power & Light Company, 529 P.2d 
423, that: 
. . . it is prejudicial error if, in a com-
parative negligence case, the court in-
structs the jury as to the effect or impact 
its fact-finding answers, in a special ver-
dict, will have on the outcome of the case. 
This instruction from the trial court does, in effect, in-
form the jury of the impact of their answers and was reversible 
error. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE LAST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER SIX. 
The last two paragraphs of instruction number six read as 
follows: 
Under the laws of this state on a mul-
tiple lane highway two single solid yellow 
longitudinal lines four inches in width and 
spaced in excess of two feet apart shall 
constitute a distinctive roadway marlcing 
to which no traffic shall travel to the left 
thereon; however the use of such a distinc-
tive roadway marking shall not be construed 
to prohibit traffic movements across, and 
where practical left turn movements must com-
mence from within such a distinctive roadway 
-12-
marking. 
Failure of a driver to operate his ve-
hicle in accordance with the foregoing re-
quirements of law would constitute negli-
gence on his part. (R. 83) 
This is not an accurate statement of the law. Instruction six 
is not based on any statute nor any judicial interpretation of 
the laws of this State. Its origin is the following resolution 
passed by the Utah State Road Commission on February 13, 1970. 
Two single solid yellow-longitudinal 
lines, four inched in width and spaced in 
excess of two feet apart, shall constitute 
a distinctive roadway marking to which no 
traffic shall travel to the left thereof, 
however, the use of such a distinctive road-
way marking shall not be construed to pro-
hibit traffic movements across, and where 
practical, left-turn movements must commence 
from within such a distinctive roadway mark-
ing. (R. 4 8) (emphasis added) 
This resolution is faulty for three reasons: (1) the resolu-
tion is confusing and unclear; (2) there has been no adequate 
notice given to the public that it is law; and (3) the Road Com-
mission went beyond its authority in passing such a resolution. 
(1) The resolution is confusing and unclear. r 
The language of the resolution requires that if two yellow 
longitudinal lines dividing the center of the road are any wider • 
than two feet apart, left turns across them must, whenever prac-
tical, be commenced from within them. Is it ever practical for 
a motorist to commence a left turn from within lines that are 
two feet apart? What about lines that are three feet apart, or 
four, or five? How far apart must lines be before it becomes 
practical for the driver of a motor vehicle to commence a left 
turn from within two lines? Certainly the driver of an automobile 
-13-
cannot commence a left turn entirely within two lines that are 
only two feet apart. Should he try to commence his left turn as 
much as possible from within the lines? It is inconceivable that 
the law would require a motorist to commence left turns by placing 
the left two or three feet of his vehicle within two narrow lines, 
yet the literal wording of the resolution appears to require it* 
Thus, as the resolution stands, it is vague and unclear, and 
should not be given the force of law. 
The resolution is unclear for another reason. The Road Com-
mission provides a diagram which ostensibly explains the intent 
and meaning of the resolution. The bottom third of the diagram 
shows a maneuver which the diagram says is not permitted. (See 
Diagram R. 49) The maneuver depicted is a vehicle leaving a 
driveway and turning left over the two lines that constitute the 
distinctive markings described in the resolution. However, the 
language of the resolution does not forbid such a maneuver. The 
language of the resolution states broadly that movement of traf-
fic across the distinctive markings described in the resolution 
are permitted. The only restriction of movement across said mark-
ings is that when practical, left turns must commence within 
the markings, as depicted at the top of the diagram. (R. 48, 
49) This resolution clearly does not apply to a motorist leav-
ing a driveway and turning across the center lines as described 
at the bottom of the diagram; for at no time is it practical or 
even possible to commence a left turn within lines in the center 
of the road when a motorist is making a left turn out of a driveway 
and across the road. Thus, the maneuver shown to be forbidden in 
the diagram is not forbidden by the language of the resolution. 
-14-
in the diagram is not forbidden by the language of the resolution. 
Such vagueness and self-contradiction is unreasonable and should 
not be considered law. 
(2) No adequate notice has been given to the public that it is 
law. The second reason why this resolution should not be consid-
ered law is because adequate notice has never been given that 
this resolution has been passed and that it purports to be law. 
The copy of the resolution was introduced into the record on the 
Court's own motion. The resolution was contained in a memorandum 
sent by the Department of Public Safety to all law enforcement 
officers, prosecutors and judges. Surely a private memo to the 
police, prosecutors and judges cannot constitute adequate notice 
to the public. No reference is made in the Utah Driver's Manual 
to the types of traffic maneuvers mentioned in the resolution, 
nor to the meaning of the distinctive highway markings described 
therein. It is doubtful that the drivers in this State are aware 
that there is such a resolution, or that when they encounter the 
highway markings described therein, know what they signify. To 
promote as law something as obscure as this resolution goes 
against all concepts of adequate notice* 
(3) The Road Commission went beyond .its authority in passing 
such a resolution. The resolution should not be recognized as 
law because the Road Commission exceeded its authority in issu-
ing it. The statutes that the resolution purports to modify are 
§§41-6-63 and 41-6-63.10 of the U.C.A., 1953. With regard to 
these two sections, the Road Commission's authority is specifical-
ly limited to: (1) deciding what types of highway markings will 
be used to restrict vehicles from traveling to the left of the 
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Such vagueness and self-contradiction is unreasonable and should 
not be considered law. 
(2) No adequate notice has been given to the public that it is 
law. 
The second reason why this resolution should not be consid-
ered law is because adequate notice has never been given that 
this resolution has been passed and that it purports to be law. 
The copy of the resolution was introduced into the record on the 
Courtfs own motion. The resolution was contained in a memorandum 
sent by the Department of Public Safety to all law enforcement 
officers, prosecutors and judges. Surely a private memo to 
the police, prosecutors and judges cannot constitute adequate 
notice to the public. No reference is made in the Utah Driver1s 
Manual to the types of traffic maneuvers mentioned in the resolu-
tion, nor to the meaning of the distinctive highway markings 
described therein. It is doubtful that the drivers in this 
State are aware that there is such a resolution, or that when 
they encounter the highway markings described therein, know 
'what they signify. To promote as law something as obscure 
as this resolution goes against all ideas of adequate notice. 
(3) The Road Commission went beyond its authority in passing 
such a resolution. 
The resolution should not be recognized as law because 
the Road Commission exceeded its authority in issuing it. 
The statutes that the resolution purports to modify are §§41-
6-63 and 41-6-63.10 of the U.C.A., 1953. With regard to these 
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two sections, the Road Commission's authority is specifical-
ly limited to: (1) deciding what types of highway markings 
will be used to restrict vehicles from traveling to the left 
of the center of the highway; and (2) deciding where to place 
such markings. The statutes never give the Road Commission 
the authority to decide what type of traffic movement may be 
made across such markings. Indeed, the statute specifically 
states that where there are markings of the type described 
in the Commission's resolution, no traffic movements of any 
kind may be made "over, upon, or across" such markings* Thus, 
the resolution is in direct contradiction to the statute it 
attempts to clarify and should not be given the effect of law* 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the appellants submit that the Court erred 
for the following reasons: 
1/ The trial court erred in denying the appellants' motion 
for a directed verdict that respondent was negligent as a matter 
of law for failing to keep a proper lookout. 
2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury on sud-
den peril. 
3. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
that it is not negligence as a matter of law to fail to properly 
heed highway markings if they are obliterated and illegible. 
4. The trial court erred in instructing the jury of the 
effect that their decision would have on the case in light of 
the comparative negligence statute. 
5. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
the resolution of the State Road Commission was, in fact, the 
•' • - 1 7 - : 
law. 
For the foregoing reasons, appellants request the Court to 
reverse the decision of the lower court and remand the case to • 
the trial court with an order requiring the trial court to enter 
a directed verdict in favor of the appellants, or in the alterna-
tive, an order remanding the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Party Defendant, Appellants 
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